Exhibit A – AT&T ILEC Interstate Access Tariffs

ACCESS SERVICE

- 6. Switched Access Service (cont'd)
 - 6.9 Rates and Charges (cont'd)
 - 6.9.4 Data Base Services

Description	Per Query Rates
(A) 800 Service	
(1) 800 Call-Routing Query Charge - per query	\$.002304(I)
(2) 800 Carrier-ID-Only Charge - per query	.001108(I)
(3) Additional Functions800 Routing Options Chargeper query using options	.000199
POTS Translation Charge - per query with POTS	.000000
(B) Local Number Portability (LNP) Query Service	
(1) LNP Query - Default,Per QueryEnd OfficeTandem Office	.002002 .002002
(2) LNP Database Access Query Per Query	.001003

ACCESS SERVICE

- 6. Switched Access Service (cont'd)
 - 6.9 Rates and Charges (cont'd)
 - 6.9.2 End Office (cont'd)
 - (D) Common Switching Optional Features (cont'd)

Description	FID/ USOC	Nonrecurring Charge	Monthly Rate
Description	0300	Charge	Nate
Called Directory Number Delivery (FGD) - Per Message - All States	CDND	None	\$0.00 (R)
Calling Billing Number Delivery (Automatic Number Identification) (available with FGD) - Per Message - All States	ANI	None	0.00 (R)
Basic Initial Address Message Delivery - Per Message - All States		None	.000600
Signal Formulation - Per Message - IAM - TCAP			.000451 .000450

(This page filed under Transmittal No. 1810)

Issued: June 16, 2014 Effective: July 1, 2014

(D)

ACCESS SERVICE

- 6. Switched Access Service (Cont'd)
 - 6.9 Rates and Charges (Cont'd)
 - 6.9.1 Switched Transport (Cont'd)
 - (D) Chargeable Optional Features

(1)	Reserved for Future Use				
(2)	Signal Transfer Point (STP) Access	<u>USOC</u>	Monthly <u>Rate</u>	Nonrecurring <u>Charge</u>	
	All States - Per Port	PT8SX	\$380.00	\$390.00	
(3)	Signal Switching Per Message	<u>USOC</u>		Per Signaling <u>Message</u>	
	- IAM - TCAP			0.000117 0.000150	
(4)	Signal Tandem Switching Per Message - IAM			0.000160	
(5)	Signal Transport Per Message - IAM - TCAP			0.000026 0.000038	

(This page filed under Transmittal No. 1870)

ACCESS SERVICE

6.	Switched	Access	Service	(Cont'd
.	DWICCIICA	1100000	DOT ATOC	100110

6.8 Rates and Charges (Cont'd)

6.8.12 Toll Free Access

	Basic Toll Free Access Query		Recurring Charges
	- Per query		\$0.004777(R)
	POTS Translation		
	- Per query		0.000000
	Multiple Destination Routing		
	- Per query		0.000459(R)
	Six Digit Master Number List Turnard	ound	
	- Per query		0.001500
6.8.13	Billing Name and Address (BNA) Servi	ce Rates	
	Billing Name and AddressFound, per listingBilling Name and Address		\$0.30
	Not Found, per listing		0.28(R)
6.8.14	500 Access Service	USOC	Nonrecurring Charges
			1st Additional
	Activating/Deactivating Each NXX Per Central Office		
	- Per Order	NRB5F/SACCH	\$0.00 \$0.00

(This page filed under Transmittal No. 396)

TARIFF F.C.C. NO. 1 ORIGINAL PAGE 6-379

ISSUED: JUNE 16, 2011

EFFECTIVE: JULY 1, 2011

ACCESS SERVICE

6 - BellSouth SWA Service (Cont'd)

6.8 Rates and Charges (Cont'd)

6.8.11 Toll Free Dialing Database

BellSouth SWA Toll Free Dialing Ten Digit Screening Service

-	Per Toll Free Dialing Call Utilizing BellSouth SWA 8XX Toll Free Dialing Ten Digit Screening Service with	Per Query
	Toll Free Dialing Number Delivery	\$.00421
-	Per Toll Free Dialing Call Utilizing BellSouth SWA 8XX Toll Free Dialing Ten Digit Screening Service with Toll Free Dialing Number Delivery for Toll Free Dialing Numbers with Optional Complex Feature, i.e., Call Handling and Destination Features	\$.004296
-	Per Toll Free Dialing Call Utilizing BellSouth SWA 8XX Toll Free Dialing Ten Digit Screening Service with POTS Number Delivery	\$.00383
-	Per Toll Free Dialing Call Utilizing BellSouth SWA 8XX Toll Free Dialing Ten Digit Screening Service with POTS Number Delivery for Toll Free Dialing Numbers with Optional Complex Feature, i.e., Call Handling and Destination Features	\$.00431

Exhibit B – Peerless Interstate Access Tariff

ACCESS SERVICE TARIFF

SECTION 8 – RATES AND CHARGES

8.2 Miscellaneous Services (cont'd)

8.2.3 Billing and Collection Services

(A) <u>Billi</u>	ng Name and Address Service	Recurring charge	
Service	Establishment	\$250	
Query c	harge – Per TN	\$0.20	
	tic Number Identification -Per attempt	\$0.0121	
Recordi	ng per customer message	\$0.0081	
8.2.4 <u>8YY Data</u>	Base Service		
	er Identification -Per query in below jurisdiction		
	, CA, CT (SNET), FL, GA, IL, IN, KS, KY, MO, MS, NC, NV, OK, OH, SC, TN, TX, WI	\$0.005	
AZ, CO UT, WA	, IA, ID, MN, MT, ND, NE, NM, OR, SD, A, WY,	\$0.0045	
CT (Ver	rizon), DC, DE, MA, MD, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VA, WV	\$0.006	
ME, NH	I, VT	\$0.0037	
AK		\$0.0070	
НІ		\$0.0070	
	Dial-Around Compensation -Per toll free call	\$0.65	
8.2.6 End Use Per DSC Per ISD		\$0.20 \$4.60	(I) (I)

Issued: July 16, 2015 Effective: July 31, 2015

Exhibit C - Letter from Mr. William Carnell to Mr. John Young



William S. Carnell Associate General Counsel 1320 N. Courthouse Road Arlington, VA 22201 703-351-3180 william.s.carnell@verizon.com

December 15, 2017

John F. Young, Esq. Markus Williams Young & Zimmermann LLC 1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 4550 Denver, CO 80203

Re: Notice of Breach

Dear Mr. Young:

In correspondence addressed to John Trofimuk and myself, Terry Ruth and David Aldworth of Teliax have alleged that Verizon is in breach of its commitments to Teliax, and that Verizon owes Teliax a very large amount of money. I have investigated these allegations, and concluded that precisely the opposite is true. Teliax materially breached the terms of our settlement agreement, and must refund the amounts previously paid by Verizon.

The 2015 settlement agreement between Verizon and Teliax required that during the prospective term, Teliax "shall not bill Verizon for traffic that is the product of fraud or illegal activity (e.g. auto-dialed 8YY traffic)." This prohibition was critically important to Verizon, for there is truly no limit to the quantity of outbound traffic (and the level of billings) that otherwise could be generated.

Verizon assumed that Teliax would abide by this commitment not to bill for such traffic, and in reliance on that commitment for nearly two years Verizon paid the amounts billed by Teliax. In the summer of 2017, Verizon noticed a spike in traffic (and billings), and performed an audit. Based on the patterns and characteristics of that traffic, including data derived from Teliax and in some cases from Verizon's own network, it appears that much of Teliax's traffic was in fact "the product of fraud or illegal activity," including "auto-dialed 8YY traffic."

In his note dated December 14, David Aldworth suggests that this conclusion was based on a misunderstanding of available data. That is not correct.

Teliax says that most of the traffic it receives from customers lacks accurate data reflecting the actual calling party. This alone is a red flag. But rather than identify and correct the source of the bad traffic, Teliax instead covered it up, by aggregating and assigning that bad traffic to a series of spoofed calling party numbers. Rather than assign unique and identifiable calling party numbers, Teliax deliberately aggregated the bad traffic and randomized its distribution into a

CONFIDENTIAL VZ-0000276

John F. Young, Esq. December 15, 2017 Page 2

limited collection of spoofed numbers. Thus the original patterns associated with that bad traffic were obscured, like so many shuffled decks of cards. If Teliax had deliberately set out to hide fraud and robocalling, it could not have done better than the system it currently has in place.

Despite Teliax's apparent best efforts to obscure its own traffic, Verizon was able to identify some fraudulent traffic nonetheless. This was a difficult process that required Verizon to manually identify certain calls that were supposed in the Teliax call records to have originated from or terminated to customers associated with Verizon's own network. I do not intend to share that process, lest someone find a way to thwart it. At the end of the analysis, Verizon did conclude that at least a portion of Teliax's traffic was indeed "the product of fraud or illegal activity."

It's notable that Teliax openly advertises that it pays for outbound 8YY traffic, and invites anyone generating such traffic to take advantage of Teliax's "well established rates." (Were some of those rates "established" through a contract with Verizon?) We all know that any fool with an Internet connection can generate millions of minutes of 8YY traffic; and a somewhat more clever fool can make that fraud difficult to detect. Unprincipled hackers can generate essentially unlimited amounts of fraudulent 8YY traffic – if they are given the incentive. Teliax provided that incentive. You literally got what you paid for.

Teliax undertook a strict and unconditional obligation not to bill Verizon for any traffic that was the product of fraud or illegal activity, including auto-dialed 8YY calls. In keeping with that obligation, Teliax should have implemented strict safeguards to ensure its compliance. But it did not. To the contrary, Teliax ignored the red flags of fraud and camouflaged its existence, while it profited from the fraud and actively encouraged its perpetrators.

For over two years Teliax has been billing, and Verizon has been paying, for fraudulent traffic, in material breach of its agreement not to do so. Since February 1, 2015, Verizon has paid Teliax \$3,290,790.92 in reliance on Teliax's broken promise not to bill for traffic that is the product of fraud or illegal activity. We ask that this entire amount be promptly refunded.

William S. Carnell

CONFIDENTIAL VZ-0000277

Exhibit D – Excerpt from Deposition of Adam Panagia (December 3, 2015)

```
Page 1
1
2
             IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
             CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:15-cv-01472-RBJ
     ----x
    TELIAX, INC., d/b/a Teliax
    Colorado, LLC,
5
6
               Plaintiff/
               Counter-Defendant,
               VS.
8
    AT&T CORP.,
9
               Counter-Plaintiff/
10
               Defendant, and
11
    BELLSOUTH LONG DISTANCE, INC.,)
    D/B/A AT&T LONG DISTANCE
12
    SERVICE,
13
               Defendant.
14
15
16
                  DEPOSITION OF ADAM PANAGIA
17
                  Bedminster Township, New Jersey
18
                  Thursday, December 3, 2015
19
20
21
22
23
    Reported by:
24
    CORINNE J. BLAIR, CRR, CCR, RPR, CLR
25
     JOB #: 100687
```

- 1 Panagia 2 0 Let's turn to AT&T's dealings with 3 Teliax. When did you first become familiar with Teliax? Probably as far back as 2013. 0 What brought it to your attention? Teliax is a wholesale customer of AT&T's, and my team performs fraud 10 investigations. And, very specifically, international revenue share fraud 11 12 investigations. And we've sent Teliax 13 several heads-ups that their customers were 14 getting hit with PBX or voicemail fraud. 15 Could you elaborate; what do you 0 16 mean their customers were being hit? 17 Teliax was delivering fraudulent Α 18 international traffic to our network. 19 when we -- we would let them know that 20 they're delivering fraud traffic and that 21 their customer probably has a problem with 22 their phone equipment being compromised. 23 What happened as a result of that
- A It wasn't a discussion. It was just

discussion?

24

- 1 Panagia
- a referral. We send an alert to Teliax.
- NOC. And they handle it accordingly with
- 4 their customer.
- 5 Q Have you seen that subsequent to
- 6 that time?
- 7 A Probably, maybe five or six times,
- 8 we've sent such alerts.
- 9 Q Is that common within the industry
- to see these alerts?
- A Absolutely.
- 12 Q Could you explain what a fraudulent
- international call would be?
- A Sure. There's a big fraud problem
- in the industry called international revenue
- share fraud. And that's when hackers
- compromise U.S. business phone systems and
- they dial international numbers that -- that
- receive a revenue share back to the hacker.
- Q When is the next time you got
- 21 involved with Teliax?
- A Probably about March of this year.
- 23 And that was more access-related.
- The National Access Management team
- brought to my attention that there was a

```
1 Panagia
```

- Q Have you ever heard the term
- 3 non-compliant caller ID?
- ⁴ A Yes.
- ⁵ Q What does that mean to you?
- A It means to me a caller ID value
- 7 that's not a valid telephone number format.
- 8 Q Why would that appear; do you have
- 9 any idea?
- 10 A Could be a translation issue, but
- more likely a spoofing issue.
- Q Okay. Does AT&T want those calls
- completed?
- 14 A No.
- Q Have you ever indicated to Teliax to
- block those calls? Has AT&T ever indicated
- 17 that?
- A Not to my knowledge.
- 19 Q Would it be appropriate to bill end
- office access on those calls?
- 21 A I don't know.
- Q Tandem access?
- A I don't know.
- Q Does AT&T have internal reporting
- 25 systems for calls?

Exhibit E – Excerpt from Deposition of Kimberly Meola (December 3, 2015)

```
Page 1
             IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
             CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:15-cv-01472-RBJ
        ----X
    TELIAZ, INC., d/b/a Teliax
    Colorado, LLC,
               Plaintiff/
               Counter-Defendant,
               VS.
8
    AT&T CORP.,
9
               Counter-Plaintiff/
10
               Defendant, and
    BELLSOUTH LONG DISTANCE, INC.,)
11
    D/B/A AT&T LONG DISTANCE
12
    SERVICE,
13
               Defendant.
14
15
               DEPOSITION OF KIMBERLY A. MEOLA
16
17
                 Bedminster Township, New Jersey
                  Thursday, December 3, 2015
18
19
20
21
22
23
     Reported by:
24
     CORINNE J. BLAIR, CRR, CCR, RPR, CLR
25
     JOB #: 100687
```

- 1 Meola
- 2 A So for a VOIP provider, these calls
- are noematic, and we would utilize and expect
- 4 to pay a national average tandem switching
- ⁵ rate.
- 6 Q Would you use the -- if CLEC
- 7 number 2 had a tariff on file with the FCC
- 8 that had a tandem rate, would you use that
- 9 rate?
- 10 A I can't answer that question. It
- depends. Generally, yes, but there are
- exceptions to that, based on how the tariff's
- filed and when the tariff's filed and the
- other situations that might arise around the
- 15 call flow.
- Just because a tariff is on file
- doesn't mean that it makes it appropriate.
- 18 Q For domestically-originated
- 19 toll-free calls, has AT&T ever requested a
- carrier or VOIP provider to block those, that
- you're aware of?
- A Not that I'm aware of.
- Q For internationally-originated
- calls, has AT&T ever requested a VOIP provider
- or a CLEC to block those calls, to your

Exhibit F – Excerpt from Deposition of Alison Miller (December 2, 2015)

```
Page 1
            IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
            CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:15-cv-01472-RBJ
    -----x
    TELIAX, INC., d/b/a Teliax
5
    Colorado, LLC,
6
              Plaintiff/
              Counter-Defendant,
7
              VS.
8
    AT&T CORP.,
              Counter-Plaintiff/
              Defendant, and
10
11
    BELLSOUTH LONG DISTANCE, INC.,)
    D/B/A AT&T LONG DISTANCE
12
    SERVICE,
13
              Defendant.
14
15
               DEPOSITION OF ALISON L. MILLER
              Bedminster Township, New Jersey
17
18
                 Wednesday, December 2, 2015
19
20
21
22
23
    Reported by:
24
    CORINNE J. BLAIR, CRR, CCR, RPR, CLR
25
    JOB No: 100685
```

1 Miller

- ² correctly, if there was a CLEC that had a
- dialer, and it spoofed caller ID information
- and just dialed AT&T served toll-free numbers,
- but there was no one to answer the call or
- speak, that would be fraud?
- A My understanding is, yes, that would
- 8 fall under our fraud.
- 9 Q You would expect those to be
- 10 blocked?
- A We would expect whoever's sending
- those to no longer be sending those.
- O Would AT&T work with Teliax to
- identify those calls, where they might be
- coming from?
- A If it is possible to identify --
- usually AT&T would note, but it would be
- Teliax that would need to be able to tell who
- that was coming from. We have no vision into
- who's behind Teliax.
- Q Okay. Besides international calls
- not going through international gateways and
- fraudulent spoofed calls, are there any other
- instances where AT&T does not expect Teliax to
- deliver 8YY calls intended for AT&T's network

```
1 Miller
2 to AT&T?
```

- 3 A Caveating by gaving
- A Caveating by saying if it's a

legitimate domestic switched access

- originated call, and Teliax receives that, we
- 6 would expect that call to be sent through the
- ⁷ proper channels to AT&T.
- 8 O Would that include calls where
- ⁹ the -- you have determined that the telephone
- number making the call is not a Teliax
- 11 telephone number?
- 12 A That call would still be routed to
- us. What is at question is the compensation
- for that traffic.
- Dut you would expect those calls to
- be delivered to AT&T?
- A If Teliax is receiving those calls,
- yes, we would expect those to be sent to
- 19 AT&T.
- Q Are you aware of a requirement, a
- regulatory requirement or an industry policy,
- that requires toll-free aggregators to issue
- telephone numbers to the wholesale customers?
- ²⁴ A No.
- Q Do you know if it's permissible for